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We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank independence (CBI) by relating it to political, 
institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence 
of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to 
the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of 
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1. Introduction  
 
Research on “political macroeconomics” during the last twenty years showed growing interest in 
factors affecting monetary policy and its performance. 
 
Several studies have examined the causes for monetary instability in different countries and at 
different historical times. To account for differences in inflation rates among countries, empirical 
analyses have highlighted the key role of Central Bank independence (hereinafter “CBI”): in fact, it 




The recognition of this link has encouraged the study of factors that influence the CBI. In particular, 
wide empirical literature exists
2, analyzing the economic and social determinants that cause changes 
in the degree of commitment to the monetary policy of individual countries
3. 
 
The institutional systems of countries also represent a crucial factor in determining the degree of 
independence of the central bank. Research on this topic is, however, very limited. Two major 
studies exist: Farvaque (2002) and Moser (1999), who have shown how the legal CBI is 
significantly higher in OECD countries where legal procedures are characterized by extensive 
checks and balances
4 and the state has a federal form. 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate this issue further. Changes with respect to the works by 
Farvaque and Moser develop in three directions. 
 
The first concerns the time horizon of the analysis, carried out until 2003 using the update by 
Polillo and Guillem (2005) of the legal independence index of Cukierman (1992). 
 
The second concerns the fact that the institutional variables are examined together with a number of 
economic variables that were not considered by Farvaque and Moser, including in particular the 
correlation between the country’s business cycle and the world business cycle. 
 
Finally, we use the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Lasso)  (Tibshirani, 1996) for 
selecting the determinants of CBI from a large set of explanatory variables.  The method optimally 
balances model complexity, thus avoiding models that over-fit the sample. 
 
The main contribution of the present paper is to show the existence of an “external constraint” that 




                                                 
1 For a survey see Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman (2008). 
2 Recent works on this topic include: D’Amato, Pistoresi, and Salsano (2009); Polillo and Guillem (2005). 
3 To explain cross country variation in the observed degree of independence the theoretical commitment approach 
(Rogoff 1985; Lohmann 1992) argues that the costs of an independent Central Bank, from the government’s point of 
view, consist mainly of the loss of flexibility in monetary policymaking. The balance between flexibility and credibility 
determines the equilibrium degree of central bank independence in a country. The balance between costs and benefits in 
delegating the power to manage paper money may depend on many aspects of the economy and on its institutional 
framework. 
4 In a checks and balances system the legislative function is equally divided between at least two decision-making 
bodies (two-chamber parliamentary system, or the opportunity for the active voters to request a referendum), which 
hold veto powers.   2
2. Data and methodology 
 
In this paper the CBI is considered to be an endogenous variable, measured by the legal 
independence index of Cukierman (1992), updated by Polillo and Guillem (2005) until 2003. The 
54 exogenous variables considered are economic and institutional determinants of the CBI. Our 
sample includes 24 OECD countries
5 and spans from 1980 to 2003.  
 
The economic variables used are the following: the world-wide common component in the business 
cycle (i.e., the correlation between the country’s GDP growth and the world GDP growth
6), the past 
inflation, and the size of the economy (i.e. real GDP total). They have been selected following the 
results of D’Amato, Pistoresi, and Salsano (2009), which show how these are the relevant variables 
for the OECD countries to account for the CBI
7.  
 
Sources of such data include IMF (2008) and World Bank (2008). In addition, the dummy variable 
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION (EMU) is considered, which takes the value of 1 (in the 1998-
2003 period) for the countries that joined the EMU after complying with the convergence criteria 
provided for by the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
The political and institutional variables are taken from the DPI database (2006) of the World Bank. 
Such variables are basically divided into seven different groups: those relevant to the executive 
power, the parties that make up the legislative power, the electoral rules, the stability of the political 
system, the checks and balances system, and the state form, i.e., whether or not it is a federal state.
8 
These last two groups include the variables analyzed by Farvaque and Moser.  
 
To select the determinants of the CBI from the database of 54 potential explanatory variables, we 
use the Lasso method for linear regression (Tibshirani, 1996). This method minimizes the sum of 
squared errors, with a bound on the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients. The tightness of 
the bound depends on a tuning parameter, usually selected by cross-validation (e.g., see Hastie et 
al., 2001), as is the case in this work. Differently from traditional information-theoretical 
procedures producing over-fitting models (with small model bias but large variance), selection by 
Lasso is optimal in terms of balancing such a trade-off.  
 
 
3. Regression results 
 
The Lasso method suggests 13 determinants of CBI out of 54 making up the whole sample 
considered. Their coefficients are estimated by OLS and presented in Table 1. We exclude the 
outcome from the reduced specification (Model 2) in which there are no significant variables from 
Model 1. 
 
                                                 
5 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Holland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. 
6 We use the correlation between the GDP growth in each country and a weighted average of the growth rates of the 
economies in the sample. The weights are the GDP levels in each country. The result do not depend on the proxy for the 
common component. On this point, see D’Amato, Pistoresi, and Salsano (2009) note 11. 
7 See D’Amato, Pistoresi, and Salsano (2009) for further details on the variables and their relation with the CBI. 
8 Please refer to the DPI (2006) for a definition of each variable included in the above-mentioned groups. The previous 
version of this database is described  in Beck at al. (2001). ). The updated  DPI (2006) by Keefer (2006)  is maintained 
at the URL:  http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40. Note that we use the same variable definitions when we comment the 
results.  Note that we use the same variable definitions when we comment the results.    3
Central Bank independence is larger the higher the correlation between the country’s business cycle 
and the world business cycle (WORLD CYCLE). To understand this result, consider that 
governments expect their economies to be in the same state as the world’s (booms or busts) as 
foreign economies. All governments in each country have a strategic incentive to commit monetary 
policy in order to free ride on the stabilization provided abroad and gain credibility at home. Hence, 
the larger the correlation is among shocks, the larger the incentive to hold a commitment (i.e., the 
larger the CBI).  
 
A negative relation between CBI and PAST INFLATION supports the idea stressed by Cukierman 
(1992) that inflation leads to the evolution of automatic accommodative mechanisms such as 
indexation of contracts in the labor and capital markets to the general price level. Society reduces 
opposition to inflation and public pressure for an independent Central Bank.  
 
The dummy EMU suggests that the participation in the EURO encouraged individual countries to 
change the institutional design of the monetary policy in view of greater price stability. 
 
We find FEDERALISM is a significant element of a country’s institution associated with CBI. As 
suggested by Farvaque and Moser, federalist countries may promote a stable monetary policy by 
constraining fiscal policy. In addition, federalism determines society’s inclination towards price 
stability by strengthening the influence of the financial opposition to inflation (Posen, 1995). 
 
Both variables relevant to the electoral systems are highly significant: PLURALITY and 
HOUSESYSTEM. 
 
PLURALITY (which points to the presence of a uninominal majority electoral system) is positively 
correlated: The countries whose governments are elected using the majority system are generally 
supported by strong and broad majorities, and this leads the political contenders to subtract the 
monetary policy ex ante from the scope of the government, lest it be exploited for electoral 
purposes. 
 
Such interpretation seems to be confirmed by the negative correlation of HOUSESYSTEM (which 
points to the presence of a mixed electoral system, i.e., partly majority-based and partly 
proportional). The countries where such electoral laws are in place are characterized by greater 
political fragmentation and by a stricter control over the government by the opposition. Therefore 
their incentive to commit is weaker. 
 
This result is further confirmed, in part, by the party variables. In fact, OPP3VOTE (rate of votes of 
an opposition made up of three parties) is significant and negatively correlated. This means that 
highly fragmented parliaments have a negative impact on the degree CBI. The EXECSPEC variable 
(which specifies whether the governing parties support any special interests) has a negative impact 
on the degree of CBI. Finally, the GOV2SEAT variable (the share of votes of 2-party governments) 





This paper confirms the role of federalism as one of the determinants of a country’s incentive to 
commit to monetary policy stressed by Farvaque and Moser, while the role of the checks and 
balances does not look significant. Another finding is the existence of an “external constraint”, 
which seems to guide the individual countries in their choice of the institutional design of the 
monetary policy. In particular, such constraint is posed both by written rules (i.e., compliance with   4
the convergence criteria to join the EMU), and by the correlation between the country’s business 
cycle and the world business cycle. 
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Table 1. Determinants of the Central Bank Independence (CBI) 
 
   
MODEL 1  
 
 
MODEL 2  



















Party variables       
GOV2SEAT    0.0007***    3.65  0.0007***     4.09 
GOVOTHST  - 0.0032***  - 4.92  -0.003***   - 4.95 
OPPVOTE -0.0007  -1.35  -------------- ----------- 
OPP2VOTE -0.0002  -  0.18  -------------- ----------- 
OPP3VOTE  - 0.007***  - 4.58  -0.008***  -5.80 




     
PLURALITY    0.08***    4.96    0.079***    4.98 
HOUSESYSTEM -  0.16***  -  9.80 -0.17***  -10.87 
 
Stability -  Checks and Balance 
 
     




     




     
PAST INFLATION  - 0.002**  - 2.91  -0.002**  -2.93 
WORLD CYCLE 
 
  0.128***    5.76  0.131***  6.08 
Monetary institution       
EMU    0.45***  28.63  0.38***  23.39 
        




0.7045   0.7048  
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